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Abstract:  
We present a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring pro-
competitive effects and a competitive limit, and investigate the impact of trade on welfare 
and efficiency. Contrary to the constant elasticity case, in which all gains from trade are 
due to product diversity, our model allows for a welfare decomposition between gains 
from product diversity and gains from pro-competitive effects. We show that the market 
outcome is not efficient because too many firms operate at an inefficiently small scale by 
charging too high markups. We further illustrate that trade raises efficiency by narrowing 
the gap between the equilibrium utility and the optimal utility. As the population gets 
arbitrarily large in the integrated economy, the equilibrium utility converges to the optimal 
utility because of the competitive limit. We finally extend the variable elasticity model to a 
multi-sector setting, and show that intersectoral distortions are eliminated in the limit. 
The multi-sector model allows us to illustrate some new aspects arising from 
intersectoral and intrasectoral allocations, namely that trade leads to structural 
convergence, rather than sectoral specialization, and that trade induces domestic exit in 
the nontraded sector. 
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1 Introduction
Few trade theorists would disagree with the statement that product diversity, scale economies,
and pro-competitive effects are central to any discussion about gains from trade and efficiency
under monopolistic competition.1 Yet, it is fair to say that these questions have not been
fully and jointly explored within a simple and solvable general equilibrium model.2 This is
largely due to the fact that the workhorse model, namely the constant elasticity of substitution
(henceforth, CES) framework, displays two peculiar features. First, it does not allow for pro-
competitive effects so that “there is no effect of trade on the scale of production, and the
gains from trade come solely through increased product diversity” (Krugman, 1980, p.953).
Second, the equilibrium in the CES model is usually constrained (second-best) optimal, i.e.,
the market provides the socially desirable number of varieties at an efficient scale (Dixit and
Stiglitz, 1977). Consequently, trade is not efficiency enhancing in the CES model because it
does not correct the only existing market failure, pricing above marginal cost.
In order to more fully explore gains from trade and efficiency under monopolistic com-
petition, we must depart from the standard CES model. Doing so, however, has long been
difficult since the variable elasticity of substitution (henceforth, VES) model in Krugman
(1979) has “not proved tractable, and from Dixit and Norman (1980) and Krugman (1980)
onwards, most writers have used the CES specification [. . .] with its unsatisfactory implica-
tions that firm size is fixed by tastes and technology, and all adjustments in industry size
(due to changes in trade policy, for example) come about through changes in the number of
firms” (Neary, 2004, p.177). Building on the new VES specification by Behrens and Murata
(2007), which satisfies the properties of the utility function in Krugman (1979), we present a
simple general equilibrium model of international trade featuring pro-competitive effects (i.e.,
profit-maximizing prices are decreasing in the mass of competing firms) and a competitive
limit (i.e., profit-maximizing prices converge to marginal costs when the mass of competing
firms becomes arbitrarily large). Within this framework, where varieties, markups, firm-level
scale economies are endogenous, we investigate the impact of trade on welfare and efficiency.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, unlike in the standard CES model, the
market outcome is not efficient because too many firms operate at an inefficiently small scale
due to the negative externality each firm imposes on the others through markups. Note that
in a more general CES model presented in Benassy (1996), where market power and taste for
1Dixit (2004, p.128) summarizes the gains from trade under monopolistic competition as follows: (i) avail-
ability of greater variety; (ii) better exploitation of economies of scale; and (iii) greater degree of competition,
driving prices closer to marginal costs. More recently, the World Trade Organization (2008, pp.48-50) provides
a similar classification: (i) gains from increased variety; (ii) gains from increased competition; and (iii) gains
from increased economies of scale.
2For instance, the World Trade Organization (2008, p.48) states that “(a)s far as the gains from intra-
industry trade are concerned, most studies have focused on either one of the variety, scale or pro-competitive
(price) effects of trade opening”.
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variety are disentangled, the equilibrium mass of firms can also be larger (or smaller) than
the optimal one. However, that inefficiency is not due to pro-competitive effects as markups
are constant because of the CES specification. Accordingly, entry restriction (or promotion),
if any, would not affect price-cost margins in Benassy (1996), whereas it would in our model
since markups depend on the mass of firms competing in the market.
Second, due to pro-competitive effects, autarky markups are no longer the same across
countries of different sizes. It is therefore not obvious that free trade leads to the equalization
of price-cost margins and to product and factor price equalization when country sizes differ,
labor markets are segmented, and products are differentiated. For instance, the seminal paper
by Krugman (1979, p.476) states, after pointing out that “countries have identical tastes and
technologies”, that “(s)ymmetry will ensure that wage rates in the two countries will be equal
and that the price of any good produced in either country will be the same”, even in the
presence of country-size asymmetry. As we are not aware of any formal proof of this assertion,
we provide one in this paper.3
Third, contrary to the CES case, in which all gains from trade are due to greater product
diversity, our model allows for a welfare decomposition between gains from product diversity
and gains from pro-competitive effects. It is worth emphasizing that such a welfare decompo-
sition is necessary for understanding each channel through which gains from trade materialize.
Recently, Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) compared the estimated gains from trade in a VES
model based on Feenstra (2003) with those in the CES model by Broda and Weinstein (2006).
Interestingly, although the overall gains are roughly the same between the two specifications,
the underlying mechanism is quite different: the CES model ascribes all gains to new import
varieties, whereas in the VES model increased product diversity explains only two-thirds of the
overall gains with the remaining one-third being driven by pro-competitive effects. Ignoring
endogenous markups may thus overstate gains from new import varieties.
Fourth, we illustrate that trade raises efficiency by narrowing the gap between the equilib-
rium utility and the optimal utility. In our model, product diversity is greater in equilibrium
than in optimum. The associated equilibrium gains approach zero as the population gets
arbitrarily large in the integrated economy. By contrast, while markups are too high, the
associated equilibrium losses also vanish in the limit as prices converge to marginal costs.
Hence, we obtain the overall efficiency result.
Our approach is closely related to that of Feenstra (2003) in that both the mass of varieties
and markups are made endogenous without relying on an additively separable numeraire good.
However, there are several important differences. For instance, to solve for prices, Feenstra
(2003) uses an approximation that applies to the case where markups are sufficiently small. In
our framework, exact prices are obtained. Furthermore, in Feenstra (2003) there is no closed
3The absence of a formal proof in Krugman (1979) is not an exception. On the contrary, most monopolistic
competition models of trade assume, rather than prove, that product price equalization holds under free trade.
See Helpman (1981) for another representative example.
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form solution for the direct utility function, although it is homothetic. By contrast, we use
a class of non-homothetic preferences that admits a workable direct utility function. Finally,
our model is tractable enough for obtaining several analytical results and for incorporating
labor market clearing and zero profit conditions that must be satisfied in general equilibrium.4
Hence, our approach is complementary to that of Feenstra (2003).
Finally, we extend our framework to include two monopolistically competitive sectors.
Extending Krugman (1979) to a multi-sector setting has been difficult since preferences over
varieties in each sector are non-homothetic. As is well known and as pointed out by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977, p.302) in the context of monopolistic competition, under such non-homothetic
preferences, two-stage budgeting is not applicable.5 Our specification, however, allows for
closed form solutions for all equilibrium expressions, even in the two-sector case. This enables
us to explore some new aspects arising from intersectoral and intrasectoral allocations.
The main contribution of the two-sector analysis is threefold. First, despite intersectoral
heterogeneity, we can establish the efficiency result, namely that intersectoral distortions are
eliminated as the population gets arbitrarily large in the integrated economy, while losses
from intrasectoral distortions vanish in the limit as in the single-sector case. Second, when
both sectors are freely traded, we can establish structural convergence, i.e., countries having
different sectoral compositions under autarky converge to the same industry structure under
free trade. This is in sharp contrast to the prediction of Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin
models that trade causes sectoral specialization. Furthermore, unlike the new trade theory
that emphasizes intra-industry trade between similar countries, with similarity giving rise
to more trade, we show that countries become more similar due to trade, thus suggesting
circular causation between similarity and intra-industry trade. Finally, when either of the
two sectors is nontraded, we can show that trade induces domestic exit, or a variety loss in
the nontraded sector.6 Unlike in the single-sector case with a traded good, such a variety
loss in the nontraded sector is not compensated by import varieties. Given that the observed
share of nontraded goods is not negligible, this suggests an important welfare implication:
monopolistic competition models that abstract from nontraded varieties may overestimate
gains from trade.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a single-sector
model, and Section 3 focuses on the autarky case. Section 4 analyzes the trade equilibrium,
4See Behrens et al. (2009) for an example using such general equilibrium conditions when estimating a
gravity equation.
5See Epifani and Gancia (2011) for a recent multi-sector analysis on the class of utility functions to which
two-stage budgeting is applicable.
6This is reminiscent of what Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) call the “domestic exit effect” in the traded
sector, i.e., a decrease in the mass of varieties produced in each country that is illustrated in Krugman (1979)
and Feenstra (2004, Ch.5). One notable difference is that, in our extended model with a nontraded good,
trade induces domestic exit in the nontraded sector.
7Dotsey and Duarte (2008), for instance, state that consumption of nontraded goods accounts for about 40
percent of GDP in the United States.
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decomposes the gains from trade, and shows that trade enhances efficiency. Section 5 extends
the single-sector model to a multi-sector setting. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We first analyze the single-sector case. Consider a world with two countries, labeled r and s.
Variables associated with each country will be subscripted accordingly. There is a mass Lr
of workers/consumers in country r, and each worker supplies inelastically one unit of labor.
Thus, Lr also stands for the total amount of labor available in country r. We assume that
labor is internationally immobile and that it is the only factor of production.
2.1 Preferences
There is a single monopolistically competitive industry producing a horizontally differentiated
consumption good with a continuum of varieties. Let Ωr (resp., Ωs) be the set of varieties
produced in country r (resp., s), of measure nr (resp., ns). Hence, N ≡ nr + ns stands
for the endogenously determined mass of available varieties in the global economy. Interna-
tional markets are assumed to be integrated, so that each firm in each country sets a unique
free-on-board price for consumers in both countries. We assume that preferences are addi-
tively separable over varieties as in Krugman (1979), and that the sub-utility functions are
of the ‘constant absolute risk aversion’ (CARA) type as in Behrens and Murata (2007). A
representative consumer in country r solves the following utility maximization problem:
max
qrr(i), qsr(j)
Ur ≡
∫
Ωr
[
1− e−αqrr(i)] di+ ∫
Ωs
[
1− e−αqsr(j)] dj
s.t.
∫
Ωr
pr(i)qrr(i)di+
∫
Ωs
ps(j)qsr(j)dj = Er,
(1)
where α > 0 is a utility parameter; Er stands for the expenditure; pr(i) denotes the price of
variety i, produced in country r; and qsr(j) stands for the per-capita consumption of variety j,
produced in country s and sold in country r.
The demand functions for country-r consumers are given by (see Appendix A.1):
qrr(i) = − 1
α
ln pr(i) +
Er
P
+
1
α
H
P
(2)
qsr(j) = − 1
α
ln ps(j) +
Er
P
+
1
α
H
P
, (3)
where P ≡ ∫
Ωr
pr(i)di +
∫
Ωs
ps(j)dj and H ≡
∫
Ωr
pr(i) ln pr(i)di +
∫
Ωs
ps(j) ln ps(j)dj are
the sum of prices and a measure of price dispersion, respectively. Mirror expressions hold for
country-s consumers. Because of the continuum assumption firms are negligible, and thus take
P and H as given. The own-price derivatives of the demand functions are then as follows:
∂qrr(i)
∂pr(i)
= − 1
αpr(i)
∂qsr(j)
∂ps(j)
= − 1
αps(j)
, (4)
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which yields the variable demand elasticities εrr(i) = [αqrr(i)]
−1 and εsr(j) = [αqsr(j)]
−1.8
Mirror expressions hold again for country-s consumers.
2.2 Technology
All firms have access to the same increasing returns to scale technology. To produce Q(i)
units of any variety requires l(i) = cQ(i) + F units of labor, where F is the fixed and c is the
marginal labor requirement. We assume that firms can costlessly differentiate their products
and that there are no scope economies. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
firms and varieties, so that the mass of varieties N also stands for the mass of firms operating
in the global economy. There is free entry and exit in each country, which implies that nr and
ns are endogenously determined by the zero profit conditions. Consequently, the expenditure
Er equals the wage wr. Under integrated markets, the profit of firm i ∈ Ωr is then as follows:
Πr(i) = [pr(i)− cwr]Qr(i)− Fwr, (5)
where Qr(i) ≡ Lrqrr(i) + Lsqrs(i) stands for its total output.
2.3 Equilibrium
Country-r (resp., country-s) firms maximize their profit (5) with respect to pr(i) (resp., ps(j)),
taking the vectors (nr, ns) and (wr, ws) of firm distribution and wages as given.
9 This yields
the following first-order conditions:
∂Πr(i)
∂pr(i)
= Qr(i) + [pr(i)− cwr]
[
Lr
∂qrr(i)
∂pr(i)
+ Ls
∂qrs(i)
∂pr(i)
]
= 0, (6)
∂Πs(j)
∂ps(j)
= Qs(j) + [ps(j)− cws]
[
Ls
∂qss(j)
∂ps(j)
+ Lr
∂qsr(j)
∂ps(j)
]
= 0. (7)
We define a price equilibrium as a distribution of prices satisfying (6) and (7) for all i ∈ Ωr and
j ∈ Ωs. We will discuss its existence, uniqueness, and some other properties in the following
sections.10 An equilibrium is a price equilibrium and vectors (nr, ns) and (wr, ws) of firm
distribution and wages such that national labor markets clear, trade is balanced, and firms
8Our utility function Ur thus has the same properties as those in Krugman (1979) because it is additively
separable across varieties, the sub-utility is increasing and concave in q, and the elasticity of demand ε decreases
with q.
9It is well known that price and quantity competition yield the same outcome in monopolistic competition
models with a continuum of firms (Vives, 1999, p.168). We thus focus on prices as the only choice variable.
10As shown by Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977), the existence of (price) equilibria is usually problematic
in monopolistic competition models, since firms’ reaction functions may be badly behaved. Because our model
relies on a continuum of firms, which are individually negligible, we do not face this problem. In a similar
spirit, Neary (2003) uses a general equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition with a continuum of sectors,
in which firms are ‘large’ in their own markets but ‘negligible’ in the whole economy. This also allows to restore
equilibrium since firms cannot directly influence aggregates of the whole economy.
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earn zero profits. Formally, an equilibrium is a price equilibrium satisfying (6) and (7), and a
solution to the following three conditions:∫
Ωr
[
cQr(i) + F
]
di = Lr, (8)∫
Ωs
[
cQs(j) + F
]
dj = Ls, (9)
Ls
∫
Ωr
pr(i)qrs(i)di = Lr
∫
Ωs
ps(j)qsr(j)dj, (10)
where all quantities are evaluated at a price equilibrium. It is readily verified that firms earn
zero profits when conditions (8)–(10) hold. One may set either wr or ws as the numeraire.
However, we need not choose a numeraire since the model is fully determined in real terms.11
3 Autarky
Assuming that the two countries can initially not trade with each other, we first characterize
the equilibrium and the optimum in the closed economy, and show that there are too many
firms operating at an inefficiently small scale in equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we
consider country r in what follows.
3.1 Equilibrium
Inserting (2) and (4) into (6), and letting qrs(i) = ∂qrs(i)/∂pr(i) = 0, one can show that the
price equilibrium is symmetric and unique, and given by (see Appendix A.2 for the derivation):
par =
(
1 +
α
cnar
)
cwar , (11)
where an a-superscript henceforth denotes autarky values. At the symmetric price equilibrium,
the profit of each firm is given by Πar = Lrq
a
rr (p
a
r − cwar )−Fwar . Using the consumer’s budget
constraint war = n
a
rp
a
rq
a
rr, the above expression can be rewritten as Π
a
r = p
a
rq
a
rr[Lr (1− cnarqarr)−
Fnar ]. Zero profits then imply that the quantities must be such that
qarr =
1
c
(
1
nar
− F
Lr
)
, (12)
which are positive because narF < Lr must hold from the resource constraint when n
a
r firms
operate. Utility is then given by
U(nar) = n
a
r
[
1− e−αc
(
1
nar
− F
Lr
)]
. (13)
11The choice of the numeraire is immaterial in our monopolistic competition framework. This is an important
departure from general equilibrium oligopoly models, where the choice of the numeraire is usually not neutral
(Gabszewicz and Vial, 1972).
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Note that (12) and (13) hold whenever prices are symmetric and firms earn zero profit.
Inserting qarr = w
a
r/(n
a
rp
a
r) into the labor market clearing condition (8), we get:
nar =
Lr
F
(
1− cw
a
r
par
)
. (14)
The equilibrium mass of firms can then be found by using (11) and (14), which yields:12
nar =
√
4αcFLr + (αF )2 − αF
2cF
≡ ν(α, Lr) > 0. (15)
The function ν will be useful to make notation compact when extending the model to a two-
sector setting. The output per firm is given by Qar ≡ Lrqarr = (Lr/nar)(war/par) = Lr/(cnar +α),
where we use (11). Plugging (15) into the last expression, we have
Qar =
2FLr√
4αcFLr + (αF )2 + αF
=
F
α
ν(α, Lr). (16)
Finally, inserting (15) into (13), the equilibrium utility in autarky is given by
U(Lr) =
√
4αcFLr + (αF )2 − αF
2cF
[
1− e−
2αF√
4αcFLr+(αF )2+αF
]
> 0, (17)
which is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of the population size Lr for all
admissible parameter values, i.e., α > 0, c > 0, F > 0, and Lr > 0. Alternatively, the
equilibrium utility can be expressed in terms of ν as U(Lr) = ν(α, Lr)[1− e−Fν(α,Lr)/Lr ].
3.2 Optimum
We now analyze the first-best problem. The planner maximizes the utility, as given by (1),
subject to the technology and resource constraint (8). The first-order conditions of this prob-
lem with respect to qrr(i) show that the quantities must be symmetric. This, together with
(8), implies that:
qrr =
Qr
Lr
=
1
c
(
1
nr
− F
Lr
)
. (18)
Hence, the planner maximizes
U(nor) = n
o
r
[
1− e−αc
(
1
nor
− F
Lr
)]
, (19)
with respect to the mass of varieties nor, where an o-superscript henceforth denotes the first-
best values. Utility maximization requires the following first-order condition to hold:
cnor
α + cnor
= e
−α
c
(
1
nor
− F
Lr
)
=⇒ −
(
1 +
α
cnor
)
e
−
(
1+ α
cnor
)
= −e−1− αFcLr . (20)
12The other root is negative and must, therefore, be ruled out.
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Using the Lambert W function, which is defined as the inverse of the function x 7→ xex (e.g.,
Corless et al., 1996; Hayes, 2005), the latter can be rewritten as:
−
(
1 +
α
cnor
)
=W
(
−e−1− αFcLr
)
.
Solving this equation for nor yields a unique optimal mass of firms
nor = −
α
c
[
1 +W−1
(
−e−1− αFcLr
)] > 0, (21)
where W−1 is the real branch of the Lambert W function satisfying W (−e−1−αF/(cLr)) ≤ −1
(Corless et al., 1996, pp.330-331; Hayes, 2005).13 Note that W−1 is increasing in Lr, and that
−∞ < W−1 < −1 for 0 < Lr <∞.
Furthermore, letting Qor be the optimal output per firm given by n
o
r(cQ
o
r + F ) = Lr, we
can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There are too many firms operating at an inefficiently small scale in equilibrium,
i.e., nar > n
o
r and Q
a
r < Q
o
r.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that excess entry arises because of pro-competitive effects (∂par/∂n
a
r < 0 by (11)). The
negative externality each firm imposes on the other firms gives rise to the ‘business-stealing
effect’ (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986, p.49), i.e., the equilibrium output per firm declines as
the number of firms grows (∂Qar/∂n
a
r = ∂(Lrq
a
rr)/∂n
a
r < 0 by (12)).
Interestingly, this result contrasts starkly with the constant elasticity case, where the
equilibrium mass of varieties is (second-best) optimal.14 Stated differently, the basic CES
model does not account for the tendency that too many firms produce at an inefficiently small
scale in autarky (the so-called ‘Eastman-Stykolt hypothesis’; Eastman and Stykolt, 1967), an
argument often used to criticize import-substituting industrialization policies (Krugman et al.,
2012, pp.292-293) or tariff barriers (Horstmann and Markusen, 1986) on efficiency grounds.
Combining (19) and (20) yields Uo(nor) = αn
o
r/(α+cn
o
r). Inserting (21) into this expression,
the optimal utility is given by
Uo(Lr) = − α
cW−1
(
−e−1− αFcLr
) > 0, (22)
which is a strictly increasing function of the population size Lr for all admissible parameter
values, i.e., α > 0, c > 0, F > 0, and Lr > 0.
13As −e−1 < −e−1−αF/(cLr) < 0, there is another possible real value of W (−e−1−αF/(cLr)) satisfying
−1 < W (−e−1−αF/(cLr)) < 0. However, it leads to nor < 0 and must, therefore, be ruled out.
14This can be seen from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977, p.301), when letting s = 1 and θ = 0 in their equations
(20) and (21), since there is no homogeneous good in our setting.
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4 Free trade
We now analyze the impacts of trade on welfare and efficiency in a world with pro-competitive
effects and a competitive limit. Section 4.1 analyzes the equilibrium. Section 4.2 then shows
the existence of gains from trade and decomposes them into gains from product diversity and
gains from pro-competitive effects. Section 4.3 finally illustrates that trade narrows the gap
between the equilibrium utility and the optimal utility by driving prices closer to marginal
costs.
4.1 Equilibrium
We have shown that the profit-maximizing price under autarky is given by (11), where nar is
evaluated at (15). Accordingly, markups in autarky are no longer the same across countries of
different sizes. It is therefore not obvious that free trade leads to the equalization of price-cost
margins and to product and factor price equalization when country sizes differ, labor markets
are segmented, and products are differentiated. Assume that both countries can trade freely.
The profits and the first-order conditions are still given by (5)–(7), respectively. Using these
expressions, we establish the following result.
Proposition 2 Free trade leads to product and factor price equalization, i.e., pr(i) = ps(j) = p
for all i ∈ Ωr and for all j ∈ Ωs, and wr = ws = w. The price equilibrium is then given by
p =
(
1 +
α
cN
)
cw, (23)
where markups are equalized across varieties and countries.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that (23) is an extension of the autarky case (11). Since prices and wages are equalized,
qrr = qsr = qss = qrs = w/(Np) must hold by (2) and (3). Accordingly, all firms sell the same
quantity Q = (Lr + Ls)q. Labor market clearing then implies that nr/ns = Lr/Ls, which,
together with q = w/(Np), yields
nr =
Lr
F
(
1− cw
p
)
. (24)
Plugging (23) into (24) and the analogous expression for country s, we obtain two equations
with two unknowns nr and ns. Solving for the equilibrium masses of firms, we get
nr =
Lr
Lr + Ls
√
4αcF (Lr + Ls) + (αF )2 − αF
2cF
ns =
Ls
Lr + Ls
√
4αcF (Lr + Ls) + (αF )2 − αF
2cF
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Thus, the equilibrium mass of firms in the global economy is given by
N = nr + ns =
√
4αcF (Lr + Ls) + (αF )2 − αF
2cF
= ν(α, Lr + Ls), (25)
which is an extension of the autarky expression (15). The output per firm is then given by
Q = (Lr + Ls)q = [(Lr + Ls)/N ](w/p) = (Lr + Ls)/(cN + α), where we use (23). Plugging
(25) into the last expression, we have
Q =
2F (Lr + Ls)√
4αcF (Lr + Ls) + (αF )2 + αF
=
F
α
ν(α, Lr + Ls). (26)
The impacts of trade on product diversity, markups, and output per firm are the same as those
in Krugman (1979) and Feenstra (2004), except that we obtain the closed form solution for
each variable that is useful for many applications such as efficiency and multiple sectors. When
compared with autarky, free trade leads in each country to: (i) greater product diversity, an
increase in the mass of varieties consumed, N > max{nar , nas}; (ii) pro-competitive effects, a
decrease in markups, p/(cw) < min{par/(cwar), pas/(cwas )}; (iii) domestic exit effects, a decrease
in the mass of varieties produced, max{nr, ns} < nar ; and (iv) better exploitation of scale
economies, an increase in output per firm, Q > max{Qar , Qas}.15
These results capture the relationship among product diversity, markups, and output per
firm. First, the mass of varieties consumed increases due to new import varieties by property
(i). This intensifies competition and reduces markups by property (ii), thus driving some firms
out of each domestic market by property (iii).16 Labor market clearing then makes sure that
output per firm expands by property (iv), as labor is reallocated from the fixed requirements of
closing firms to the marginal requirements of surviving firms. This is an important departure
from the standard CES model, in which only channel (i) operates. Recall that the equalization
of markups in Proposition 2 holds regardless of country size. In autarky, a smaller country
has a smaller mass of firms, which implies higher markups. Therefore, markups in a smaller
country decrease more than those in a larger country under free trade. Similarly, a smaller
country experiences a greater increase in product diversity and output per firm.
Our approach is closely related to that of Feenstra (2003) in that both the mass of varieties
and markups are made endogenous without relying on a quasi-linear specification. However,
there are several important differences. For instance, to solve for prices, Feenstra (2003)
uses an approximation that applies to the case where markups are sufficiently small. In our
framework, exact prices are obtained. Furthermore, in Feenstra (2003) there is no closed form
solution for the direct utility function, although it is homothetic. By contrast, we use a class of
15It is readily verified that expressions (15) and (25) yield claim (i), which, together with (11) and (23),
implies (ii). Claim (ii) and expressions (14) and (24) then yield (iii). Finally, from (16) and (26), we obtain
claim (iv).
16In the CES model by Lawrence and Spiller (1983, Proposition 7), trade leads to a redistribution of existing
firms between the two countries while the total mass of firms remains unchanged. This result is driven by
changes in relative factor prices and, as pointed out by the authors, need not hold under variable markups.
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non-homothetic preferences that admits a workable direct utility function. Our model is also
tractable enough for obtaining several analytical results and for incorporating labor market
clearing and zero profit conditions that must be satisfied in general equilibrium. Note that
although there is a growing literature on firm heterogeneity in international trade (e.g., Melitz,
2003), the price-cost margin for each firm is usually assumed to be constant in those models
because of the CES specification.17
One notable exception is Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who illustrate pro-competitive effects
in a quasi-linear framework with firm heterogeneity. Both their and our models predict that
the market size is the crucial determinant of markups. However, the extent of the market
in question differs, and so does the mechanism that drives the markup reduction. In Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008), the local market size matters for the (average) prices and markups, so
that the size of the trading partner has no impact on the domestic utility level, as well as the
number of firms selling in the home country (see their expressions (23)–(25)). In contrast,
in our model, it is the global market size (Lr + Ls) that affects the prices and markups, as
well as the mass of varieties consumed, utility, and efficiency. This difference, which gives rise
to quite different policy implications regarding the choice of trading partners, arises due to
income effects. Indeed, we can show that if the numeraire good were added to our model, the
prices and markups would be exogenously fixed by preferences (α) and technology (c), and thus
independent of the global market size. As discussed in detail by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008,
Sections 3.5 and 3.6), firm heterogeneity models, and more generally, monopolistic competition
models, typically display either increased factor market competition as in Melitz (2003) or
increased product market competition as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). We allow for both
factor and product market competition by incorporating income effects as in Melitz (2003)
and pro-competitive effects as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Our framework is thus useful
especially when analyzing how trading partners of different size affect domestic consumption
diversity and markups, as well as welfare and efficiency.18
4.2 Welfare decomposition and gains from trade
Contrary to the CES case, in which all gains from trade are due to increased import varieties,
our model allows for both gains from product diversity and gains from pro-competitive effects.
In order to focus on each channel through which gains from trade materialize, we now decom-
pose welfare as in Krugman (1981).19 Since varieties are symmetric under both free trade and
17See Redding (2011) for a recent state-of-the-art survey on theories of heterogeneous firms and trade.
18See Behrens et al. (2009) for an example in the context of Canada-US interregional trade, where the sizes
of trading partners matter in general equilibrium. Note that such an analysis is infeasible in the quasi-linear
framework by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and as pointed out by Feenstra (2010, p.20), “its zero income
elasticities suggest that in empirical application it is best suited for partial equilibrium analysis.”
19Krugman (1981) illustrates a similar decomposition in a model where two types of sector-specific workers
earn different real wages. However, because of the CES specification, there are no pro-competitive effects.
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autarky, the utility difference is given by:
U r − Uar = N
(
1− e−αwNp
)
− nar
(
1− e−
αwar
narp
a
r
)
.
Adding and subtracting nare
−αw/(narp), and rearranging the resulting terms, we obtain the fol-
lowing welfare decomposition:
U r − Uar = N
(
1− e−αwNp
)
− nar
(
1− e− αwnarp
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Product diversity
+ nar
(
e
− αw
a
r
narp
a
r − e− αwnarp
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pro-competitive effects
. (27)
We now examine the role and the sign of each component in expression (27) in more details,
both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view.
Product diversity. The first term in (27) captures the beneficial effects of increased product
diversity, given the wage-price ratio under free trade, w/p. As shown before, trade expands the
mass of varieties consumed, despite the exit of some domestic producers. This raises utility,
holding w/p constant, as we have
Ur = N
(
1− e−αwNp
)
,
∂Ur
∂N
= 1− e−αwNp
(
1 +
αw
Np
)
> 0 ∀N.
To obtain the last inequality, let z ≡ αw/(Np) and h(z) ≡ 1 − e−z(1 + z). Clearly, h(0) = 0
and h′(z) > 0 for all z > 0, which shows that for any given wage-price ratio w/p, utility
increases with the mass of varieties consumed.
Despite its central role in new trade theory, little is known about the empirical importance
of gains from product diversity (Feenstra, 1995). Yet, there is an emerging literature on
measuring gains from varieties. Using extremely disaggregated data and the method developed
by Feenstra (2004), Broda and Weinstein (2006) document that the number of varieties in US
imports rose by 212% between 1972 and 2001, and according to their estimates this maps
into US welfare gains of about 2.6% of GDP. A more recent study by Feenstra and Weinstein
(2010), however, points out that the CES specification used in Broda and Weinstein (2006)
ignores endogenous markups and thus may overstate gains from import varieties. Indeed,
Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) compare the estimated gains from trade in a VES model based
on Feenstra (2003), with those in Broda and Weinstein (2006). Interestingly, although the
overall gains are roughly the same between the two specifications, the underlying mechanism
is quite different: the CES model ascribes all gains to new import varieties, whereas in the
VES model increased product diversity explains only two-thirds of the overall gains with the
remaining one-third being driven by pro-competitive effects.
Pro-competitive effects. The second term in (27) captures the beneficial effects of inten-
sified competition, given the mass of firms under autarky, nar . As shown before, trade reduces
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markups, which ceteris paribus raises utility. It is worth emphasizing that the reduction in
markups is a social gain: lower markups in a zero-profit equilibrium indicates a smaller wedge
between firm’s marginal and average costs, which implies larger output per firm and greater
economies of scale. Note that war/p
a
r = w/p would hold in the CES case, i.e., there would be
no gains from trade due to pro-competitive effects.
It is well known from various industrial organization studies that prices in many imperfectly
competitive industries are increasing functions of producer concentration (see Schmalensee,
1989, pp.987-988, for a survey). In our symmetric equilibrium, the Herfindahl-index of con-
centration, defined as the sum of squared market shares, reduces to H = N(1/N)2 = 1/N .
Since the mass of firms is increasing in market size in our model, markups are lower in larger
markets (see Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005, for empirical evidence). Similarly, by increas-
ing the number of competitors in each market, import competition decreases concentration,
which maps into lower consumer prices. Several case studies confirm this ‘imports-as-market-
discipline hypothesis’ (e.g., Levinsohn, 1993; Harrison, 1994; Tybout, 2003). More recently,
Badinger (2007) finds solid evidence that the Single Market Programme of the EU has reduced
markups by 26% in aggregate manufacturing of 10 member states.
Let us summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 3 Free trade raises welfare both by increasing the mass of varieties consumed
and by reducing markups.
Proof. To prove our claim, it is sufficient to examine the sign of the two components in (27).
As shown above, they are both positive, which ensures gains from trade.
4.3 Entry, markups, and efficiency
We now compare the equilibrium and optimal allocations in the global economy. Since in
our model free trade amounts to increasing the population size, the result on excess entry
established in Section 3.2 continues to hold, even under free trade. Stated differently, there
is a unique optimal mass of firms No < N satisfying the first-order condition (20) under free
trade. Hence, there are too many firms operating at an inefficiently small scale and the market
outcome is not efficient. Furthermore, it can be verified that
lim
L→0
N
No
= 1 and lim
L→∞
N
No
=
√
2
hold regardless of parameter values.20 By continuity, for a sufficiently small population size,
excess entry tends to be small, whereas it gets larger when the population gets arbitrarily
large.
20When taking the limit of expressions involving the Lambert W function, we use Mathematica, where
W−1(·) can be computed by ProductLog[-1,·]. Note that we will use ProductLog[·] for the principal branch
of W (·) that we will encounter in the subsequent analysis.
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Turning to pro-competitive effects, expressions (23) and (25) yield
p
cw
= 1 +
2αF√
4αcFL+ (αF )2 − αF and
∂
∂L
( p
cw
)
< 0.
It is then readily verified that our model exhibits a competitive limit
lim
L→0
p
cw
=∞ and lim
L→∞
p
cw
= 1,
so that prices converge to marginal costs as the population gets arbitrarily large. Despite the
fact that there remains excess entry even when the population gets arbitrarily large in the
integrated economy, the associated gains from excessive varieties are shown to approach zero
in the limit. As the gap between prices and marginal costs eventually vanishes, we obtain the
overall efficiency result as follows.21
Proposition 4 When the population gets arbitrarily large in the integrated economy, the equi-
librium utility converges to the optimal utility, i.e.,
lim
L→∞
U(L) = lim
L→∞
Uo(L) =
α
c
.
Proof. Applying l’Hospital’s rule to (17), it is readily verified that limL→∞ U(L) = α/c.
Furthermore, by definition of the Lambert W function, limL→∞W−1(−e−1−αF/(cL)) = −1
holds. Hence, taking the limit of expression (22) yields limL→∞ U
o(L) = α/c.22
Proposition 4 uses the optimum given technology and the resource constraint that has been
analyzed in Section 3.2. Alternatively, we can confirm the efficiency result by implementing
the first-best allocation via marginal cost pricing po = cwo. This requires lump-sum transfers
as each firm earns negative profits −Fwo. When there is a mass No of operating firms, a lump-
sum tax (NoFwo)/L is levied on each consumer’s income. Accordingly, the income net of this
tax is given by Eo = wo(1 − NoF/L). The consumer’s budget constraint qo = Eo/(Nopo),
together with po = cwo, then immediately yields qo = (1/c)(1/No−F/L), which is the same as
(18). Hence, the planner faces the same utility (19) to maximize, thus achieving the optimal
mass of varieties given by (21).
This alternative way of implementing the first-best allocation allows for a welfare decom-
position in terms of product diversity and pro-competitive effects as follows.
U − Uo = N
(
1− e−αwNp
)
−No
(
1− e− αw
o
Nopo
)
= N
(
1− e−αwNp
)
−No
(
1− e− αwNop
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
excess entry
+No
(
e−
αwo
Nopo − e− αwNop
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
too high markups
,
21This result is reminiscent of Mankiw and Whinston (1986, Proposition 3) who establish conditions for
the equilibrium utility in a partial equilibrium closed-economy model to converge to the optimal utility when
excess entry gets large.
22See Behrens and Murata (2006, Appendix E) for an alternative proof that does not use the Lambert W
function.
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where we add and subtract No[1 − e−αw/(Nop)], and rearrange the resulting terms. The first
term is positive due to the excessive mass of varieties, N > No, given the equilibrium wage-
price ratio. By definition of the optimal utility, the second term must be negative, reflecting
too high equilibrium markups, p/(cw) > po/(cwo) = 1, given the optimal mass of varieties.
As U < Uo, the second term must always dominate the first term in any economy of finite
size. Yet, by taking the limit of each term, we have
lim
L→∞
[
N
(
1− e−αwNp
)
−No
(
1− e− αwNop
)]
= 0
lim
L→∞
No
(
e−
αwo
Nopo − e− αwNop
)
= 0,
which shows that both equilibrium gains from excessive varieties and equilibrium losses from
too high markups vanish in the limit, thereby yielding the overall efficiency result.
The limit result established in Proposition 4 may be extended to a finite economy by
investigating whether
max
{
U(Lr)
Uo(Lr)
,
U(Ls)
Uo(Ls)
}
<
U(L)
Uo(L)
< 1,
where the last inequality comes from the definition of the optimum. Whether U/Uo monoton-
ically increases in L is not a trivial question since both the equilibrium and the optimal utility
increase in L, as can be seen from (17) and (22). Figure 1 shows that N/No is increasing
in L, meaning that excess entry gets larger as the population increases.23 At the same time,
Figure 2 illustrates that [p/(cw)]/[po/(cwo)] = p/(cw) is decreasing in L, implying that the gap
between the equilibrium prices and marginal costs gets smaller as the population increases.
The overall effect is depicted in Figure 3. As expected, U/Uo < 1. The market outcome thus
remains inefficient for finite population sizes. However, since U/Uo increases monotonically
with L, trade between larger countries yields higher efficiency than trade between smaller
countries.
[Insert Figures 1-3 around here]
5 Two-sector model
We now extend our basic model to include two sectors, each of which produces a differenti-
ated good. Doing so allows us to shed light on various issues arising from intersectoral and
intrasectoral allocations. In particular, we establish the following three results. First, when
both sectors are freely traded, countries having different sectoral compositions under autarky
converge to the same industry structure under free trade. This is in sharp contrast to the
prediction of Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models that trade causes sectoral specialization.
23The parameter values for Figures 1-3 are as follows: α = {0.1, 1, 5}; c = 0.5; and F = 1. Other admissible
parameter values yield qualitatively similar figures, thus suggesting that the underlying property is robust.
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Furthermore, unlike the new trade theory, where more similar countries engage in more intra-
industry trade, we show that countries become more similar due to trade, thus suggesting
circular causation between similarity and intra-industry trade. Second, despite intersectoral
heterogeneity, we establish the efficiency result, namely that intersectoral distortions are elim-
inated as the population gets arbitrarily large in the integrated economy, while losses from
intrasectoral distortions vanish in the limit as in the single-sector case. Finally, when either
of the two sectors is nontraded, trade induces domestic exit, or a variety loss in the nontraded
sector. Since the variety loss in the nontraded sector is not compensated by import varieties,
this result suggests an important welfare implication: monopolistic competition models that
abstract from nontraded varieties may overestimate gains from trade.
5.1 Autarky
Assume that there are two sectors, denoted by 1 and 2, each producing a horizontally dif-
ferentiated consumption good with a continuum of varieties. Without loss of generality, we
consider country r in this subsection. Let q1r and q2r denote the distribution of demands for
the varieties of good 1 and 2, respectively. We assume that preferences are (weakly) separable
across the two goods so that the utility maximization problem can be expressed as follows:
max
qr1,q2r
Ur ≡ U(U1r(q1r), U2r(q2r)) s.t.
∫
Ω1r
p1r(i)q1r(i)di+
∫
Ω2r
p2r(j)q2r(j)dj = Er, (28)
where U has standard properties. As in the single-sector case, U1r and U2r are given by
U1r ≡
∫
Ω1r
[
1− e−α1q1r(i)]di and U2r ≡ ∫
Ω2r
[
1− e−α2q2r(j)]dj.
Since U1r and U2r are not homothetic, two-stage budgeting is not applicable as pointed out by
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977, p.302). However, as shown in Appendix A.3, the demand function
for each variety in each sector can be expressed compactly as follows:
q1r(i) =
1
α1
ln
[
p˜1r
p1r(i)
]
q2r(j) =
1
α2
ln
[
p˜2r
p2r(j)
]
, (29)
where p˜1r and p˜2r are: (i) common to all firms within a sector; (ii) taken as given by each firm
because of the continuum assumption; yet (iii) endogenously determined in equilibrium (see
Appendix A.3 for their expressions). Note that p˜1r and p˜2r can be interpreted as reservation
prices since q1r(i) > 0 if and only if p1r(i) < p˜1r and q2r(j) > 0 if and only if p2r(j) < p˜2r.
Given the demand functions, as well as p˜1r and p˜2r, firms in each sector maximize profits
Π1r(i) = [p1r(i)− cwr]Lr
α1
ln
[
p˜1r
p1r(i)
]
− Fwr (30)
Π2r(j) = [p2r(j)− cwr]Lr
α2
ln
[
p˜2r
p2r(j)
]
− Fwr. (31)
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5.1.1 Equilibrium
As in the single-sector case, we first analyze the price equilibrium. LetW denote the principal
branch of the Lambert W function.24 From the first-order conditions for profit-maximization,
we obtain the prices, quantities, and operating profits under autarky as follows (see Appendix
A.4 for the derivations and the properties of W ):
pa1r =
cwar
W a1r
qa1r =
1
α1
(1−W a1r) pia1r =
Lrcw
a
r
α1
(
1
W a1r
+W a1r − 2
)
(32)
pa2r =
cwar
W a2r
qa2r =
1
α2
(1−W a2r) pia2r =
Lrcw
a
r
α2
(
1
W a2r
+W a2r − 2
)
, (33)
where
W a1r ≡W
(
e
cwar
p˜a1r
)
and W a2r ≡W
(
e
cwar
p˜a2r
)
. (34)
Since p˜a1r and p˜
a
2r are common to all firms within the same sector, the price equilibrium and
the associated quantity and operating profits in each sector are symmetric. We thus drop the
firm indices i and j.
The equilibrium is characterized by the price equilibrium, zero profits in each sector, labor
market clearing, and the relationship between p˜a1r and p˜
a
2r that results from the consumer’s
optimization problem. First, plugging the profit-maximizing prices and quantities into (30)
and (31), the zero profit conditions are given by25
Π1r =
Lrcw
a
r
α1
(
1
W a1r
+W a1r − 2
)
− Fwar = 0
Π2r =
Lrcw
a
r
α2
(
1
W a2r
+W a2r − 2
)
− Fwar = 0,
which can be uniquely solved for W a1r and W
a
2r as follows.
26
W a1r = 1−
√
4α1cFLr + (α1F )2 − α1F
2cLr
∈ (0, 1) (35)
W a2r = 1−
√
4α2cFLr + (α2F )2 − α2F
2cLr
∈ (0, 1). (36)
Expressions (35) and (36), together with (32) and (33), imply that the profit-maximizing
prices, quantities, and operating profits in one sector do not depend on the characteristics of
the other sector. This is due to the fact that preferences are (weakly) separable across goods:
given consumers’ budget allocation across sectors, firms care only about what happens in their
own sector when maximizing profits.
Using (32), (33), (35), and (36), and noting that W a1r and W
a
2r are increasing in Lr, we
know that, in autarky, equilibrium prices and quantities, pa1r, p
a
2r, q
a
1r, and q
a
2r, are smaller in
24Note that W is different from W−1 that we have introduced in Section 3.2.
25The same solution technique can be applied to the single-sector model (see Appendix A.5 for details).
26Note that the other root is greater than one, which is infeasible as it implies prices below marginal costs.
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larger countries. Equilibrium outputs, Qa1r and Q
a
2r, defined as Q
a
1r ≡ Lrqa1r and Qa2r ≡ Lrqa2r
are, however, larger in larger counties. We can also establish the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that α1 > α2. Then, the firms in sector 1 charge higher markups and
produce smaller output in each country, i.e., pa1r > p
a
2r and Q
a
1r < Q
a
2r. Furthermore, larger
countries have a smaller price ratio, pa1r/p
a
2r, and a greater output ratio, Q
a
1r/Q
a
2r.
Proof. Noting that W a1r < W
a
2r when α1 > α2, and that Lr(1−W a1r)/α1 and Lr(1−W a2r)/α2
are decreasing in α1 and α2, respectively, we obtain the first claim. Furthermore, noting that
the price ratio is given by pa1r/p
a
2r = W
a
2r/W
a
1r, it is readily verified that
∂ ln(pa1r/p
a
2r)
∂ lnLr
=
√
α2F√
4cLr + α2F
−
√
α1F√
4cLr + α1F
.
Since
√
α2F/
√
4cLr + α2F and
√
α1F/
√
4cLr + α1F are increasing in α2 and α1, respectively,
we obtain ∂ ln(pa1r/p
a
2r)/∂ lnLr < 0 when α1 > α2. Finally, differentiating the output ratio
Qa1r/Q
a
2r = (α2/α1)[(1−W a1r)/(1−W a2r)], we have
∂ ln(Qa1r/Q
a
2r)
∂ lnLr
=
1
2
( √
α1F√
4cLr + α1F
−
√
α2F√
4cLr + α2F
)
,
which, using the same argument as for the price ratio, yields the second claim.
We now turn to the equilibrium sectoral labor allocation La1r and L
a
2r and the equilibrium
masses of firms na1r and n
a
2r. This requires making use of the remaining two equilibrium
conditions – labor market clearing and the relationship between p˜a1r and p˜
a
2r – which are given
as follows (see Appendix A.3 for the latter derivation):
Lr = L
a
1r + L
a
2r, where L
a
`r ≡ na`r
[
Lrc
α`
(1−W a`r) + F
]
(37)
p˜a1r
p˜a2r
=
α1
α2
∂Ur/∂U1r
∂Ur/∂U2r
. (38)
The left-hand side of (38) is obtained by plugging W a1r and W
a
2r in (35) and (36) into the
left-hand side of (34). Indeed, we can solve uniquely for p˜a1r and p˜
a
2r from (34) as follows:
p˜a1r =
[
1 +
√
4α1cFLr + (α1F )2 + α1F
2cLr
]
e
F
Lr
ν(α1,Lr)cwar > p
a
1r
p˜a2r =
[
1 +
√
4α2cFLr + (α2F )2 + α2F
2cLr
]
e
F
Lr
ν(α2,Lr)cwar > p
a
2r,
so that the reservation prices are higher than the market prices in equilibrium.
The right-hand side of (38), in turn, can be obtained as follows. We have so far made no
explicit assumption regarding Ur. We assume in what follows that Ur ≡ β1 lnU1r + β2 lnU2r,
with β1, β2 > 0 and β1 + β2 = 1. In that case, we have
∂Ur/∂U1r
∂Ur/∂U2r
=
β1U2r
β2U1r
=
β1n
a
2r
(
1− pa2r
p˜a2r
)
β2na1r
(
1− pa1r
p˜a1r
) = β1na2r
(
1− cwar
W a2rp˜
a
2r
)
β2na1r
(
1− cwar
W a1rp˜
a
1r
) . (39)
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Plugging (39) into (38) and using the expressions for W a1r, W
a
2r, p˜
a
1r and p˜
a
2r that we have
obtained above, the two equilibrium conditions (37) and (38) depend on na1r and n
a
2r only.
Letting
κa1r ≡ e
F
Lr
ν(α1,Lr) − 1 and κa2r ≡ e
F
Lr
ν(α2,Lr) − 1, (40)
the two equations can be solved for the equilibrium masses of firms:
na1r =
La1r
Lr
ν(α1, Lr) and n
a
2r =
La2r
Lr
ν(α2, Lr), (41)
where
La1r
Lr
=
β1
κa1r
ν(α1, Lr)
β1
κa1r
ν(α1, Lr) +
β2
κa2r
ν(α2, Lr)
and
La2r
Lr
=
β2
κa2r
ν(α2, Lr)
β1
κa1r
ν(α1, Lr) +
β2
κa2r
ν(α2, Lr)
. (42)
are sectoral labor shares. We can show that, in equilibrium, less labor is allocated to the sector
with the lower elasticity of demand (larger α) or the smaller weight on utility (smaller β).
Proposition 6 Suppose that α1 > α2 and β1 = β2, or that α1 = α2 and β1 < β2. Then, less
labor is allocated to sector 1 than to sector 2 in equilibrium, i.e., La1r < L
a
2r.
Proof. Taking the difference between La1r and L
a
2r, and using (40), we have
sign {La1r − La2r} = sign
{
β1
ν(α1, Lr)
e
F
Lr
ν(α1,Lr) − 1
− β2 ν(α2, Lr)
e
F
Lr
ν(α2,Lr) − 1
}
.
Since ν(·, Lr)/[eFν(·,Lr)/Lr − 1] is decreasing in ν and ν is increasing in its first argument,
α1 > α2 and β1 = β2 imply L
a
1r < L
a
2r. When α1 = α2, we have ν(α1, Lr)/[e
Fν(α1,Lr)/Lr − 1] =
ν(α2, Lr)/[e
Fν(α2,Lr)/Lr−1]. Then, the relationship reduces to sign{La1r−La2r} = sign{β1−β2},
thus completing the proof.
Since the quantities within each sector are symmetric in equilibrium and given by qa1r =
Fν(α1, Lr)/(α1Lr) and q
a
2r = Fν(α2, Lr)/(α2Lr), the equilibrium U
a
1r and U
a
2r are written as
Ua1r = n
a
1r(1− e−α1q
a
1r) =
La1r
Lr
ν(α1, Lr)
[
1− e− FLr ν(α1,Lr)
]
(43)
Ua2r = n
a
2r(1− e−α2q
a
2r) =
La2r
Lr
ν(α2, Lr)
[
1− e− FLr ν(α2,Lr)
]
, (44)
which finally yields the equilibrium utility
Uar = β1 ln
{
La1r
Lr
ν(α1, Lr)
[
1− e− FLr ν(α1,Lr)
]}
+ β2 ln
{
La2r
Lr
ν(α2, Lr)
[
1− e− FLr ν(α2,Lr)
]}
.
The foregoing expression is an extension of the equilibrium utility in the single-sector case.
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5.1.2 Optimum
We now investigate the optimal allocation. The planner maximizes utility subject to technol-
ogy and the resource constraint in the two-sector economy. As firms are symmetric within
each sector, the first-best problem is given by
max
q1r ,q2r,n1r ,n2r
Ur = U(U1r(q1r, n1r), U2r(q2r, n2r)) s.t. Lr = n1r (Lrcq1r + F )+n2r (Lrcq2r + F ) .
As in the foregoing, we assume that Ur ≡ β1 lnU1r + β2 lnU2r with β1 + β2 = 1. Letting λ be
the Lagrange multiplier, the first-order conditions are then given by
β1
n1r
α1e
−α1q1r
1− e−α1q1r = λLrc (45)
β2
n2r
α2e
−α2q2r
1− e−α2q2r = λLrc (46)
β1
n1r
= λ (Lrcq1r + F ) (47)
β2
n2r
= λ (Lrcq2r + F ) . (48)
Expressions (47) and (48), together with the resource constraint, yield
Lr = n1r (Lrcq1r + F ) + n2r (Lrcq2r + F ) =
β1
λ
+
β2
λ
=
1
λ
.
This result, together with (47) and (48), yields the optimal sectoral labor allocation as follows
Lo1r = n1r (Lrcq1r + F ) = β1Lr and L
o
2r = n2r (Lrcq2r + F ) = β2Lr, (49)
which implies Lo1r/L
o
2r = β1/β2. Using the equilibrium and optimal labor allocation, (42) and
(49), we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose that α1 > α2. Then, the equilibrium labor allocation in sector 1 is
insufficient, whereas that in sector 2 is excessive, i.e., La1r < L
o
1r and L
a
2r > L
o
2r.
Proof. From expressions (42) and (49), the difference between the equilibrium and optimal
labor allocation is given by
La1r − Lo1r =
β1β2Lr
β1
κa1r
ν(α1, Lr) +
β2
κa2r
ν(α2, Lr)
[
ν(α1, Lr)
κa1r
− ν(α2, Lr)
κa2r
]
.
Using (40), we thus have
sign{La1r − Lo1r} = sign
{
ν(α1, Lr)
e
F
Lr
ν(α1,Lr) − 1
− ν(α2, Lr)
e
F
Lr
ν(α2,Lr) − 1
}
.
Since ν(·, Lr)/[eFν(·,Lr)/Lr − 1] is decreasing in ν and ν is increasing in its first argument,
α1 > α2 implies L
a
1r < L
o
1r. As L
a
1r + L
a
2r = L
o
1r + L
o
2r = Lr, we then also have L
a
2r > L
o
2r.
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Using (45)–(48), we show in Appendix D that the optimal mass of firms in each sector and
the optimal utility are given by
no1r = −
α1β1
c
[
1 +W−1
(
−e−1−α1FcLr
)] > 0, no2r = − α2β2
c
[
1 +W−1
(
−e−1−α2FcLr
)] > 0 (50)
and
Uor = β1 ln
− α1β1
cW−1
(
−e−1−α1FcLr
)
+ β2 ln
− α2β2
cW−1
(
−e−1−α2FcLr
)
 , (51)
whereW−1(·) is the real branch of the LambertW function satisfyingW (−e−1−αF/(cLr)) ≤ −1.
Note that expressions (50) and (51) are straightforward extensions of the single sector case.
We now consider whether or not there is excess entry. Since the equilibrium mass of firms
in each sector (e.g., na1r) depends on the characteristics of both sectors (e.g., both α1 and α2),
the proof of Proposition 1 is not applicable. However, noting that the equilibrium quantity in
each sector (e.g., qa1r) does not depend on the characteristics of the other sector (e.g., α2), we
can show that the firms in each sector operate at an inefficiently small scale in equilibrium.
It is then readily verified that at least one sector displays excess entry by using sectoral labor
misallocations established in Proposition 7.
Proposition 8 The firms in both sectors operate at an inefficiently small scale in equilibrium,
i.e., Qa1r < Q
o
1r and Q
a
2r < Q
o
2r. Furthermore, there is excess entry in at least one sector, i.e.,
when α1 > α2, we have n
a
2r > n
o
2r, whereas we have n
a
1r > n
o
1r when α1 < α2.
Proof. From (45) and (47), the optimal quantity in sector 1 must satisfy
LHS(qo1r, α1) =
e−α1q
o
1r
1− e−α1qo1r =
Lrc
α1(Lrcq
o
1r + F )
= RHS(qo1r, α1),
where both the LHS and RHS are decreasing in qo1r. Furthermore, we have limqo1r→0 LHS =∞,
limqo1r→0RHS = Lrc/(α1F ), and limqo1r→∞ LHS = limqo1r→∞RHS = 0. Since q
o
1r is uniquely
determined by (49) and (50), the RHS cuts the LHS only once from below. We now evaluate
the LHS and RHS at the equilibrium value, qa1r = (1−W a1r)/α1, and show that LHS(qa1r, α1) >
RHS(qa1r, α1). Using (35) and the definition of ν, we can show that
LHS(qa1r, α1)− RHS(qa1r, α1) =
1
e
F
Lr
ν(α1,Lr) − 1
− c
α1
ν(α1, Lr)
=
c
α1
1
e
F
Lr
ν(α1,Lr) − 1
{α1
c
− ν(α1, Lr)
[
e
F
Lr
ν(α1,Lr) − 1
]}
.
We can derive exactly the same relationship in the single sector case, except that α1 is re-
placed with α. Since we know by Proposition 1 that qar < q
o
r holds in the single sector case,
regardless of parameter values, LHS(qar , α) > RHS(q
a
r , α) must hold for any α. We thus have
LHS(qa1r, α1) > RHS(q
a
1r, α1). This establishes that q
a
1r < q
o
1r and Q
a
1r < Q
o
1r even in the
two-sector case. Similarly, we can prove that Qa2r < Q
o
2r. Finally, when α1 > α2, we know by
Proposition 7 that na2r(cQ
a
2r + F ) = L
a
2r > L
o
2r = n
o
2r(cQ
o
2r + F ). Noting that Q
a
2r < Q
o
2r, we
have na2r > n
o
2r. Similarly, when α1 < α2, we have n
a
1r > n
o
1r.
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Unlike in the single-sector case, Proposition 8 states that at least one sector displays excess
entry. In fact, we can construct numerical examples of insufficient entry in one sector when
the other sector displays excess entry. Such insufficient entry arises due to intersectoral labor
misallocations between the two differentiated sectors. For instance, when α1 > α2 we know
by Proposition 7 that na1r(cQ
a
1r + F ) = L
a
1r < L
o
1r = n
o
1r(cQ
o
1r + F ), i.e., there is insufficient
labor allocated to sector 1 in equilibrium. It is then possible to have insufficient entry in
sector 1, na1r < n
o
1r, even though the firms in sector 1 operate at an inefficiently small scale in
equilibrium, Qa1r < Q
o
1r.
27
5.2 Trade
We turn to the open economy version of our two-sector model. We first analyze the properties
of equilibrium when both goods are freely traded. We then investigate an intermediate case
where one good is freely traded, while the other is nontraded.
5.2.1 Free trade
The model involves a mixture of Sections 4 and 5.1. We denote sectors by subscripts 1 and 2,
and countries by subscripts r and s. We assume that trade is free, and that markets are
integrated. Since the price of each variety is the same in the two countries under the integrated
market assumption, we can show that PPE and FPE hold by using the same technique as in
the single-sector open economy case (see Appendix C). To alleviate notation, when there is
no confusion, we provide expressions for country r only, with mirror expressions holding for
country s. Starting with profits, we have:
Π1r(i) = [p1r(i)− cwr][Lrq1r(i) + Lsq1s(i)]− Fwr
Π2r(i) = [p2r(i)− cwr][Lrq2r(i) + Lsq2s(i)]− Fwr,
where the expressions for quantities are analogous to those in (29). Noting that PPE and FPE
hold under the integrated market assumption, and that p˜1r = p˜1s = p˜1 and p˜2r = p˜2s = p˜2, we
can aggregate demand across countries. Hence, the price equilibrium is also analogous to (32)
and (33) in Section 5.1. We further know from (34) that W1 and W2, and thus all prices and
quantities are no longer country specific. Accordingly, the zero profit conditions are given by
Π1 =
(Lr + Ls)cw
α1
(W−11 +W1 − 2)− Fw = 0
Π2 =
(Lr + Ls)cw
α2
(W−12 +W2 − 2)− Fw = 0,
27In the two-sector case, pro-competitive effects in each sector do not necessarily map into excess entry in
both sectors. Hence, the general tendency toward excess entry in partial equilibrium models (Vives, 1999,
Ch.6) does not carry over to general equilibrium models with multiple sectors.
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which, as in the foregoing, can be solved for W1 and W2 to yield:
W1 = 1−
√
4α1cF (Lr + Ls) + (α1F )2 − α1F
2c(Lr + Ls)
∈ (0, 1)
W2 = 1−
√
4α2cF (Lr + Ls) + (α2F )2 − α2F
2c(Lr + Ls)
∈ (0, 1).
By comparing the free trade and autarky values, we see that 1/W1 < min{1/W a1r, 1/W a1s}
and 1/W2 < min{1/W a2r, 1/W a2s}. In words, trade reduces markups in both sectors in both
countries due to pro-competitive effects.
The trade equilibrium is, in turn, characterized by the following four conditions. First, the
labor market in each country must clear, which requires that
Lr = n1r
[
(Lr + Ls)c
α1
(1−W1) + F
]
+ n2r
[
(Lr + Ls)c
α2
(1−W2) + F
]
(52)
Ls = n1s
[
(Lr + Ls)c
α1
(1−W1) + F
]
+ n2s
[
(Lr + Ls)c
α2
(1−W2) + F
]
. (53)
Second, the relationship between p˜1 and p˜2 is given as before by (38). The construction of
the left-hand side of (38) under free trade is analogous to that in Section 5.1. The right-
hand side of (38) is obtained by assuming again that U ≡ β1 lnU1 + β2 lnU2. We then have
(∂U/∂U1)/(∂U/∂U2) = β1U2/(β2U1), where the ratio is given by
β1U2
β2U1
=
β1(n2r + n2s)
(
1− p2
p˜2
)
β2(n1r + n1s)
(
1− p1
p˜1
) = β1(n2r + n2s)
(
1− cw
W2p˜2
)
β2(n1r + n1s)
(
1− cw
W1p˜1
) .
Finally, in the open economy, trade must balance, which requires that:
Lr
[
n1s
W−11 − 1
α1
+ n2s
W−12 − 1
α2
]
= Ls
[
n1r
W−11 − 1
α1
+ n2r
W−12 − 1
α2
]
. (54)
The four equilibrium conditions (38) and (52)–(54) yield {n1r, n2r, n1s, n2s} as follows:
n1r =
Lr
Lr + Ls
L1r
Lr
ν(α1, Lr + Ls) n1s =
Ls
Lr + Ls
L1s
Ls
ν(α1, Lr + Ls) (55)
n2r =
Lr
Lr + Ls
L2r
Lr
ν(α2, Lr + Ls) n2s =
Ls
Lr + Ls
L2s
Ls
ν(α2, Lr + Ls), (56)
where
L1r
Lr
=
L1s
Ls
=
β1
κ1
ν(α1, Lr + Ls)
β1
κ1
ν(α1, Lr + Ls) +
β2
κ2
ν(α2, Lr + Ls)
(57)
L2r
Lr
=
L2s
Ls
=
β2
κ2
ν(α2, Lr + Ls)
β1
κ1
ν(α1, Lr + Ls) +
β2
κ2
ν(α2, Lr + Ls)
, (58)
and
κ1 = e
F
Lr+Ls
ν(α1,Lr+Ls) − 1 and κ2 = e
F
Lr+Ls
ν(α2,Lr+Ls) − 1. (59)
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Hence, the population distribution between the two countries (e.g., Lr/(Lr + Ls)) and the
sectoral labor allocation (e.g., L1r/Lr) are crucial for the mass of firms in each sector in each
country. Holding the sectoral labor allocation constant, one can readily verify that there is
domestic exit in each sector due to trade, as in the single-sector case. However, trade alters the
sectoral labor allocation. This strengthens domestic exit in the shrinking sector, but weakens
the tendency toward domestic exit in the other sector. We still find domestic exit and variety
expansion in both sectors in both countries.
Having extended our single-sector model to the two-sector setting, we now address various
intersectoral issues. As shown in Section 5.1, the sectoral variables under autarky such as
the relative mass of firms, na1r/n
a
2r, the relative mass of workers, L
a
1r/L
a
2r, the relative output,
Qa1r/Q
a
2r, as well as the relative price, p
a
1r/p
a
2r, depend on the country size Lr. However, we
can show that trade eliminates these cross-country differences as follows.
Proposition 9 Trade leads to structural convergence regardless of population sizes, Lr and
Ls. The relative price, the relative output, the relative mass of firms, and the relative mass of
workers are equalized between the two countries, i.e., p1r/p2r = p1s/p2s, Q1r/Q2r = Q1s/Q2s,
n1r/n2r = n1s/n2s, and L1r/L2r = L1s/L2s hold.
Proof. The equalization of the relative price and the relative output can be obtained by
noting that W1 and W2 depend only on the world population. Using expressions (55) to (58),
it is readily verified that
n1r
n2r
=
n1s
n2s
=
β1/κ1
β2/κ2
[
ν(α1, Lr + Ls)
ν(α2, Lr + Ls)
]2
,
and that
L1r
L2r
=
L1s
L2s
=
β1/κ1
β2/κ2
ν(α1, Lr + Ls)
ν(α2, Lr + Ls)
,
where κ1 and κ2 are given by (59). Both expressions depend only on the world population
Lr + Ls, thus completing the proof.
Proposition 9 states that countries having different sectoral compositions under autarky con-
verge to the same industry structure under free trade. This is in sharp contrast to the predic-
tion of Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models that trade causes sectoral specialization. Fur-
thermore, unlike the new trade theory that emphasizes intra-industry trade between similar
countries, with similarity giving rise to more trade, Proposition 9 shows that countries become
more similar due to trade, thus suggesting circular causation between similarity and intra-
industry trade. Finally, an immediate corollary to this proposition is that, under free trade, the
smaller country is a small-scale replica of the larger country, e.g., n1r/n1s = n2r/n2s = Lr/Ls.
It should be noted, however, that this almost never holds under autarky, unlike in the CES
case. The only exception that we observe n1r/n1s = n2r/n2s = Lr/Ls even under autarky is
the case of symmetric countries Lr = Ls.
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5.2.2 Efficiency
We now analyze whether trade enhances efficiency in the two-sector model. As in the single-
sector case, free trade amounts to increasing the population size. Yet, unlike in that case, we
can address how trade affects the difference between the equilibrium and optimum through
both intersectoral and intrasectoral allocations.
Concerning intersectoral allocations, we can show that intersectoral distortions are elimi-
nated in the limit. In particular, when the population gets arbitrarily large in the integrated
economy, intersectoral output, variety, and labor distortions vanish, i.e.,
lim
L→∞
Q1
Q2
= lim
L→∞
Qo1
Qo2
=
√
α2
α1
lim
L→∞
n1
n2
= lim
L→∞
no1
no2
=
√
α1
α2
β1
β2
lim
L→∞
L1
L2
= lim
L→∞
Lo1
Lo2
=
β1
β2
.
Turning to intrasectoral distortions, it is verified that limL→0(n1/n
o
1) = limL→0(n2/n
o
2) = 1,
and that limL→∞(n1/n
o
1) = limL→∞(n2/n
o
2) =
√
2, as in the single-sector case. By continuity,
for a sufficiently small population size, excess entry tends to be small, whereas it gets larger
when the population gets arbitrarily large. Despite excess entry in the limit in both sectors,
we can show the following overall efficiency result.
Proposition 10 When the population gets arbitrarily large, the equilibrium utility converges
to the optimal utility, i.e.,
lim
L→∞
U = lim
L→∞
Uo = β1 ln
α1β1
c
+ β2 ln
α2β2
c
.
Proof. In this context, U1 and U2 in equilibrium can be expressed as in (43) and (44).
Since we already know by Proposition 4 that limL→∞ ν(α1, L)[1 − e−Fν(α1,L)/L] = α1/c and
limL→∞ ν(α2, L)[1− e−Fν(α2,L)/L] = α2/c, we now establish the limit of L1/L and L2/L. They
are given by
lim
L→∞
L1
L
= β1 and lim
L→∞
L2
L
= β2.
Hence, it is readily verified that limL→∞ U1 = α1β1/c and limL→∞ U2 = α2β2/c, so that, using
the chain rule for the limits of continuous functions, we have:
lim
L→∞
U = β1 ln
α1β1
c
+ β2 ln
α2β2
c
.
Turning to the optimum, sinceW−1(−e−1) = −1, it is readily verified that limL→∞ Uo1 = α1β1/c
and limL→∞U
o
2 = α2β2/c, so that
lim
L→∞
Uo = β1 ln
α1β1
c
+ β2 ln
α2β2
c
.
Therefore, the equilibrium is efficient in the limit, which proves our claim.
Thus, our overall efficiency result in the single-sector case carries over to the two-sector case
as intersectoral distortions vanish in the limit.
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5.2.3 Nontraded good
Assume now that sector 1 produces a nontraded good, whereas sector 2 produces a freely
traded good. Each good is differentiated as before. The objective of this subsection is to show
that trade in sector 2 induces domestic exit in the nontraded sector 1. Given this objective, it
is sufficient to focus on the simple case where the two countries are symmetric (Lr = Ls = L).
Then, we can show again that PPE and FPE hold. Since the expressions for the autarky case
are the same as those in Section 5.1, we only derive the expressions for the open economy. The
price equilibrium is analogous to the previous cases, which yields the zero profit conditions:
Π1 =
Lcw
α1
(W−11 +W1 − 2)− Fw = 0
Π2 =
2Lcw
α2
(W−12 +W2 − 2)− Fw = 0.
From those conditions, we obtain
W1 = 1−
√
4α1cFL+ (α1F )2 − α1F
2cL
∈ (0, 1)
W2 = 1−
√
8α2cFL+ (α2F )2 − α2F
4cL
∈ (0, 1).
Observe that the market size for sector 2 is doubled, whereas that for sector 1 is unchanged.
The trade equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions. First, the labor market
must clear in each country. Letting n1r = n1s = n1 and n2r = n2s = n2 by symmetry, this
requires that
L = n1
[
cL
α1
(1−W1) + F
]
+ n2
[
2cL
α2
(1−W2) + F
]
.
Second, the relationship between the two reservation prices is again given by (38). The con-
struction of the left-hand side of (38) in the open economy is analogous to that in Section 5.1.
The right-hand side of (38) is obtained by assuming as before that U ≡ β1 lnU1+β2 lnU2. We
then have (∂U/∂U1)/(∂U/∂U2) = β1U2/(β2U1), where the ratio is given by
β1U2
β2U1
=
2β1n2
(
1− p2
p˜2
)
β2n1
(
1− p1
p˜1
) = 2β1n2
(
1− cw
W2p˜2
)
β2n1
(
1− cw
W1p˜1
) .
Finally, trade is balanced because Lr = Ls = L, n2s = n2r = n2, and FPE and PPE hold.
From these conditions we obtain {n1, n2} as follows:
n1 =
L1
L
ν(α1, L) =
2 β1
κa1
ν(α1, L)
2 β1
κa1
ν(α1, L) +
β2
κ2
ν(α2, 2L)
ν(α1, L)
n2 =
1
2
L2
L
ν(α2, 2L) =
β2
κ2
ν(α2, 2L)
2 β1
κa1
ν(α1, L) +
β2
κ2
ν(α2, 2L)
ν(α2, 2L).
We can then establish the following results.
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Proposition 11 Trade induces domestic exit in the nontraded good sector, i.e., n1 < n
a
1. Put
differently, there is a consumption variety loss in the nontraded good sector.
Proof. The mass of firms in the nontraded good sector under autarky is given by
na1 =
β1
κa1
ν(α1, L)
β1
κa1
ν(α1, L) +
β2
κa2
ν(α2, L)
ν(α1, L) =
β1
κa1
ν(α1,L)
L
β1
κa1
ν(α1,L)
L
+ β2
κa2
ν(α2,L)
L
ν(α1, L),
whereas in the open economy it becomes
n1 =
2 β1
κa1
ν(α1, L)
2 β1
κa1
ν(α1, L) +
β2
κ2
ν(α2, 2L)
ν(α1, L) =
β1
κa1
ν(α1,L)
L
β1
κa1
ν(α1,L)
L
+ β2
κ2
ν(α2,2L)
2L
ν(α1, L).
The only change between autarky and free trade in sector 2 appears in the second term of the
denominator. Let ω ≡ ν(α2, 2L)/(2L). Noting that
1
κ2
ν(α2, 2L)
2L
=
1
eF
ν(α2,2L)
2L − 1
ν(α2, 2L)
2L
=
ω
eFω − 1
decreases with ω, and that ω decreases with the market size for sector 2, we get n1 < n
a
1.
Proposition 12 The mass of varieties consumed in the traded good sector increases, i.e.,
2n2 > n
a
2. Furthermore, domestic entry occurs in the traded good sector, i.e., the mass of
varieties produced in the traded sector in each country increases.
Proof. The mass of varieties consumed in the traded good sector under autarky is given by
na2 =
β2
κa2
ν(α2, L)
β1
κa1
ν(α1, L) +
β2
κa2
ν(α2, L)
ν(α2, L) =
β2
κa2
ν(α2,L)
L
β1
κa1
ν(α1,L)
L
+ β2
κa2
ν(α2,L)
L
ν(α2, L),
whereas in the open economy it becomes
2n2 = 2
β2
κ2
ν(α2, 2L)
2 β1
κa1
ν(α1, L) +
β2
κ2
ν(α2, 2L)
ν(α2, 2L) =
β2
κ2
ν(α2,2L)
2L
β1
κa1
ν(α1,L)
L
+ β2
κ2
ν(α2,2L)
2L
[2ν(α2, 2L)].
Using the same notation as in the previous proposition, and noting that 2ν(α2, 2L) > ν(α2, L),
we obtain the first claim. Turning to domestic entry, we have
n2 =
β2
κ2
ν(α2, 2L)
2 β1
κa1
ν(α1, L) +
β2
κ2
ν(α2, 2L)
ν(α2, 2L) =
β2
κ2
ν(α2,2L)
2L
β1
κa1
ν(α1,L)
L
+ β2
κ2
ν(α2,2L)
2L
ν(α2, 2L).
Again, using the same notation as in the previous proposition, we can show that n2 > n
a
2.
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These two propositions have important implications for assessing gains from trade in the
presence of nontraded goods. Although trade expands the range of varieties that consumers
face in the traded good sector, it induces domestic exit, or a variety loss in the nontraded
sector. Unlike the single sector case with a traded good, such a variety loss in the nontraded
sector is not compensated by import varieties. Accordingly, monopolistic competition models
that abstract from nontraded varieties may overestimate gains from trade.
Furthermore, our results suggest that, contrary to general belief, VES models per se may
not explain domestic exit in the traded good sector when there are nontraded varieties. This
reconfirms the importance of other factors such as firm heterogeneity in explaining domestic
exit in the traded good sector. Extending the two-sector CES model with firm heterogeneity
by Bernard et al. (2007) to a VES setting or extending the one-sector VES model with firm
heterogeneity by Dhingra and Morrow (2011) to a multi-sector setting seems to be a promising
step toward a better understanding of this issue.
6 Conclusions
We have developed a VES model of international trade displaying pro-competitive effects and
a competitive limit, and have investigated the impacts of trade on welfare and efficiency.
Unlike the standard CES model, our framework allows us to capture the impacts of trade
on varieties, markups, and exploitation of scale economies without resorting to an additively
separable numeraire good. The welfare decomposition helps us to understand the relative
contribution of product diversity and pro-competitive effects to gains from trade, which is
becoming increasingly more important given the recent empirical evidence such as Broda and
Weinstein (2006) and Feenstra and Weinstein (2010). We have also explored whether or not
trade is ultimately efficiency enhancing, and have shown that this is indeed the case.
The basic framework presented in this paper is flexible enough to allow for many extensions.
In this paper, we have provided one, namely a multi-sector setting.28 In our model, trade tends
to reduce within-sector efficiency losses, which disappear at the competitive limit. However,
as is well known, markup heterogeneity across sectors is a source of between-sector distortions
(Bilbiie et al., 2008; Epifani and Gancia, 2011), which may become more important with
freer trade. Yet, we have established that such intersectoral distortions also vanish when
the population gets arbitrarily large in the integrated economy. Our multi-sector analysis
further illustrates some new aspects arising from the interaction between intersectoral and
intrasectoral allocations, namely structural convergence, rather than sectoral specialization,
and domestic exit in the nontraded good sector induced by trade in the other sector.
Finally, as we have obtained the closed form solutions for the equilibrium utility and the
optimal utility, our model can also be extended to a multi-region setting in a spatial economy.
28Other extensions include, for instance, heterogeneous firms and trade costs (Behrens et al., 2009) and
heterogeneous consumers (Behrens and Murata, 2009).
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Doing so sheds new light on whether or not larger cities are more efficient. In such a setting, a
larger population not only allows for greater diversity but also exacerbates congestion in cities
while achieving prices closer to marginal costs. Although we have established efficiency gains
from trade in this paper, it is not obvious whether or not our efficiency result carries over to
a spatial economy with urban congestion. Exploring this formally is left for future research.
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Appendix A. Computations for equilibrium
A.1. Demand functions
A representative consumer in country r solves problem (1). Letting λ stand for the Lagrange
multiplier, the first-order conditions for an interior solution are given by:
αe−αqrr(i) = λpr(i), ∀i ∈ Ωr (A.1)
αe−αqsr(j) = λps(j), ∀j ∈ Ωs (A.2)
and the budget constraint∫
Ωr
pr(i)qrr(i)di+
∫
Ωs
ps(j)qsr(j)dj = Er. (A.3)
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Taking the ratio of (A.1) with respect to i and j, we obtain
e−α[qrr(i)−qrr(j)] =
pr(i)
pr(j)
=⇒ qrr(i) = qrr(j) + 1
α
ln
[
pr(j)
pr(i)
]
∀i, j ∈ Ωr.
Multiplying the last expression by pr(j) and integrating with respect to j ∈ Ωr we obtain:
qrr(i)
∫
Ωr
pr(j)dj =
∫
Ωr
pr(j)qrr(j)dj +
1
α
∫
Ωr
ln
[
pr(j)
pr(i)
]
pr(j)dj. (A.4)
Analogously, taking the ratio of (A.1) and (A.2) with respect to i and j, we get:
e−α[qrr(i)−qsr(j)] =
pr(i)
ps(j)
=⇒ qrr(i) = qsr(j) + 1
α
ln
[
ps(j)
pr(i)
]
∀i ∈ Ωr, ∀j ∈ Ωs.
Multiplying the last expression by ps(j) and integrating with respect to j ∈ Ωs we obtain:
qrr(i)
∫
Ωs
ps(j)dj =
∫
Ωs
ps(j)qsr(j)dj +
1
α
∫
Ωs
ln
[
ps(j)
pr(i)
]
ps(j)dj. (A.5)
Summing (A.4) and (A.5), and using the budget constraint (A.3) yield
qrr(i) =
Er − 1
α
∫
Ωr
ln
[
pr(i)
pr(j)
]
pr(j)dj − 1
α
∫
Ωs
ln
[
pr(i)
ps(j)
]
ps(j)dj∫
Ωr
pr(j)dj +
∫
Ωs
ps(j)dj
.
Finally, noting the definitions of P and H given in the main text, we obtain the demands (2).
The derivations of the demands (3) are analogous.
A.2. Price equilibrium
Behrens and Murata (2007, Proposition 2) show that the price equilibrium is symmetric and
unique. Given that result, expression (11) is obtained as follows. Plugging Qr(i) ≡ Lrqrr(i) +
Lsqrs(i) into (6), and setting qrs(i) = ∂qrs(i)/∂pr(i) = 0, we have
∂Πr(i)
∂pr(i)
= Lrqrr(i) + [pr(i)− cwr]Lr ∂qrr(i)
∂pr(i)
= 0. (A.6)
Noting that ∂qrr(i)/∂pr(i) = −1/[αpr(i)] by (4), imposing symmetry on (A.6) implies
pr − cwr
αpr
= qrr = − 1
α
ln pr +
Er
P
+
1
α
H
P
,
where we use (2) to get the last equality. Since P = nrpr and H = nrpr ln pr because of
symmetry, it can be readily verified that
pr = cwr +
αEr
nr
.
Noting that Er = wr in equilibrium as profits are zero due to free entry, we obtain (11).
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A.3. Two-sector demand functions and reservation prices
The first-order conditions for an interior solution of the utility maximization problem (28) are
given by:
∂Ur
∂U1r
α1e
−α1q1r(i) = λp1r(i), ∀i ∈ Ω1r
∂Ur
∂U2r
α2e
−α2q2r(j) = λp2r(j), ∀j ∈ Ω2r,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Applying the same technique as that we used for the
single-sector case in Appendix A.1, we readily obtain the demands as follows:
q1r(i) = − 1
α1
ln p1r(i) +
Er
Pr
+
1
α1
Hr
Pr
− 1
α2Pr
ln
(
α2
α1
∂Ur/∂U2r
∂Ur/∂U1r
)∫
Ω2r
p2r(j)dj (A.7)
q2r(j) = − 1
α2
ln p2r(j) +
α1
α2
Er
Pr
+
1
α2
Hr
Pr
+
1
α2Pr
ln
(
α2
α1
∂Ur/∂U2r
∂Ur/∂U1r
)∫
Ω1r
p1r(i)di, (A.8)
where
Pr ≡
∫
Ω1r
p1r(i)di+
α1
α2
∫
Ω2r
p2r(j)dj
Hr ≡
∫
Ω1r
p1r(i) ln p1r(i)di+
α1
α2
∫
Ω2r
p2r(j) ln p2r(j)dj
are the sum of prices and a measure of price dispersion in the two-sector economy. The
demands (A.7) and (A.8) can then be rewritten as
q1r(i) =
1
α1
ln
[
p˜1r
p1r(i)
]
, where p˜1r ≡ e
α1Er
Pr
+Hr
Pr
− α1
α2Pr
ln
(
α2
α1
∂Ur/∂U2r
∂Ur/∂U1r
) ∫
Ω2r
p2r(j)dj
q2r(j) =
1
α2
ln
[
p˜2r
p2r(j)
]
, where p˜2r ≡ e
α1Er
Pr
+Hr
Pr
+ 1
Pr
ln
(
α2
α1
∂Ur/∂U2r
∂Ur/∂U1r
)∫
Ω1r
p1r(i)di.
Observe that p˜1r and p˜2r are common to all firms within each sector, and taken as given by
each firm because of the continuum assumption. Taking the ratio of p˜1r and p˜2r, we obtain
p˜1r
p˜2r
= e
−α1
α2
1
Pr
ln
(
α2
α1
∂Ur/∂U2r
∂Ur/∂U1r
)∫
Ω2r
p2r(j)dj− 1Pr ln
(
α2
α1
∂Ur/∂U2r
∂Ur/∂U1r
) ∫
Ω1r
p1r(i)di =
α1
α2
∂Ur/∂U1r
∂Ur/∂U2r
.
A.4. Profit-maximization and properties of W
The first-order conditions ∂Π1r/∂p1r(i) = 0 are given by
ln
[
p˜1r
p1r(i)
]
= 1− cwr
p1r(i)
.
Taking the exponential of both sides and rearranging terms, we have
e
cwr
p˜1r
=
cwr
p1r(i)
e
cwr
p1r(i) .
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Noting that the Lambert W function is defined as ϕ =W (ϕ)eW (ϕ) and setting ϕ = e cwr/p˜1r,
we obtain W (e cwr/p˜1r) = cwr/p1r(i), which implies the expression of p
a
1r as given in (32).
Combining the first-order conditions and demand functions, quantities are given by q1r(i) =
(1/α1) [1− cwr/p1r(i)]. Plugging p1r(i) = pa1r, we have the expression for qa1r. The expression
for operating profits is given by pi1r(i) = [p1r(i)− cwr]Lrq1r(i), which together with pa1r and
qa1r, yields pi
a
1r. Mirror expressions hold for sector 2.
Turning to the properties of the LambertW function, ϕ = W (ϕ)eW (ϕ) implies thatW (ϕ) ≥
0 for all ϕ ≥ 0. Taking the logarithm of both sides and differentiating yield
W ′(ϕ) =
W (ϕ)
ϕ[W (ϕ) + 1]
> 0, ∀ϕ > 0.
Finally, 0 =W (0)eW (0) and e =W (e)eW (e) imply W (0) = 0 and W (e) = 1, respectively.
A.5. Application of Lambert W to the single-sector model
Take the benchmark case of a single sector (say sector 1), as developed in Sections 2 and 3.
Then, solving the zero profit condition pi1r = Fwr for W1r yields
W1r = 1−
√
4α1cFLr + (α1F )2 − α1F
2cLr
.
Substituting this expression into the labor market clearing condition
n1r (Lrcq1r + F ) = Lr ⇒ n1r
[
Lrc
α1
(1−W1r) + F
]
= Lr
yields
n1r =
√
4α1cFLr + (α1F )2 − α1F
2cF
,
which is exactly the same as (15) in the single sector case.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
We compare the equilibrium nar with the optimum n
o
r defined as the solution of the equation:
f(nr) = g(nr), where f(nr) ≡ cnr
α + cnr
and g(nr) ≡ e−
α
c (
1
nr
− F
Lr
). (B.1)
Note first that f is strictly increasing in nr, taking values from 0 to 1, and that g is also strictly
increasing, taking values from 0 to eαF/(cLr) > 1. Some standard calculations show that there
is a unique intersection since: (i) both functions are continuous; (ii) f is concave, whereas g
is convex for nr sufficiently small; (iii) the slope of f is strictly greater than that of g for nr
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sufficiently small;29 and (iv) g admits a single value for which its second-order derivative is
equal to zero.
We next show that nar > n
o
r. To prove our claim, we use a convexity argument. The
equilibrium mass of varieties is given by (15), whereas the optimal mass of varieties is the
unique solution to (B.1). First, evaluate f at nar , which yields
f(nar) =
cnar
α + cnar
=
√
4αcFLr + (αF )2 − αF√
4αcFLr + (αF )2 + αF
=
Xr − 2αF
Xr
, (B.2)
where Xr ≡
√
4αcFLr + (αF )2 + αF . Second, evaluate g at n
a
r to get
g(nar) = e
−α
c
(
1
nar
− F
Lr
)
= e−
2αF
Xr . (B.3)
Let Yr ≡ (2αF )/Xr < 1 and g(Yr) = e−Yr . Note that (B.2) can then be expressed as
f(Yr) = 1− Yr, which is tangent to (B.3) at Yr = 0:
1− Yr = g(0) + g′(0)(Yr − 0).
Since (B.3) is strictly convex, it lies strictly above its tangent. Put differently, f(Yr) = 1−Yr <
e−Yr = g(Yr) holds for all Yr > 0 (see Figure A1). Hence, the right-hand side of (B.1) exceeds
the left-hand side of (B.1) at the equilibrium mass of firms nar . By uniqueness of the optimal
mass of firms, and since the right-hand side of (B.1) exceeds the left-hand side if and only if
nr > n
o
r, we may conclude that n
a
r > n
o
r (see Figure A2). Expression (8) then implies that
nar(cQ
a
r + F ) = n
o
r(cQ
o
r + F ) = Lr, which yields Q
a
r < Q
o
r.
[Insert Figures A1 and A2 around here]
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
Conditions (6) and (7) must hold for both country-r and country-s firms at every price equi-
librium which, using (2)–(4), yields
∂Πr(i)
∂pr(i)
− ∂Πs(j)
∂ps(j)
= 0 ⇐⇒ c
[
wr
pr(i)
− ws
ps(j)
]
= ln
[
pr(i)
ps(j)
]
. (C.1)
29To check this, note that limnr→0 f
′(nr) = c/α > limnr→0 g
′(nr) = 0. The last equality is obtained as
follows. Noting that
ln g′(nr) = − 2
nr
[
ln(nr)
1/nr
+
α
2c
]
+ ln
(α
c
)
+
αF
cLr
,
and that limnr→0 lnnr/(1/nr) = 0 by l’Hospital’s rule, we have
lim
nr→0
ln g′(nr) = − lim
nr→0
2
nr
× lim
nr→0
[
ln(nr)
1/nr
+
α
2c
]
+ ln
(α
c
)
+
αF
cLr
= −∞,
which, by continuity of the logarithmic function, implies limnr→0 g
′(nr) = 0.
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It is also readily verified that
Qr(i) T Qs(j) ⇐⇒ −Lr + Ls
α
ln
[
pr(i)
ps(j)
]
T 0. (C.2)
Furthermore, an equilibrium is such that firms earn zero profit, i.e.,
Πr(i) = wr
{[
pr(i)
wr
− c
]
Qr(i)− F
}
= 0
Πs(j) = ws
{[
ps(j)
ws
− c
]
Qs(j)− F
}
= 0.
Assume that there exists i ∈ Ωr and j ∈ Ωs such that pr(i) > ps(j). Then condition (C.1)
implies that
wr
pr(i)
>
ws
ps(j)
=⇒ pr(i)
wr
<
ps(j)
ws
,
whereas condition (C.2) implies that Qr(i) < Qs(j). Hence, Πr(i) < Πs(j), which is incompat-
ible with an equilibrium. We may hence conclude that pr(i) = ps(j) must hold for all i ∈ Ωr
and j ∈ Ωs, which shows that product prices are equalized. Condition (C.1) then shows that
wr = ws, i.e., factor prices are equalized whenever product prices are equalized. Finally, since
pr(i) = ps(j) = p and wr = ws = w, we can rewrite (2)–(4) as follows:
qrr = qsr = qss = qrs =
w
Np
(C.3)
and
∂qrr
∂pr
=
∂qsr
∂ps
=
∂qss
∂ps
=
∂qrs
∂pr
= − 1
αp
. (C.4)
Inserting (C.3) and (C.4) into the first-order condition (6), we obtain the price equilibrium,
in which markups are equalized across varieties and countries.
Appendix D: The optimal masses of firms and the opti-
mal utility in the two-sector case
As in the single sector case, we first derive the optimal mass of firms in each sector. Expression
(45) becomes
β1
n1r
α1e
−α1q1r
1− e−α1q1r = c ⇒ e
−α1q1r =
cn1r
α1β1 + cn1r
. (D.1)
Expression (47), in turn, becomes
β1
n1r
=
Lrcq1r + F
Lr
⇒ q1r = 1
c
(
β1
n1r
− F
Lr
)
. (D.2)
Plugging (D.2) into (D.1), we have
e
−α1
c
(
β1
n1r
− F
Lr
)
=
cn1r
α1β1 + cn1r
⇒ −
(
1 +
α1β1
cn1r
)
e
−
(
1+
α1β1
cn1r
)
= −e−1−α1FcLr .
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We thus obtain
−
(
1 +
α1β1
cn1r
)
= W
(
−e−1−α1FcLr
)
,
which can be solved for no1r as shown in (50). The derivation of n
o
2r is analogous. Finally,
turning to the optimal utility, expressions (50) and (D.1) yield
Uo1r = n
o
1r(1− e−α1q
o
1r) = no1r
α1β1
α1β1 + cno1r
= − α1β1
cW−1
(
−e−1−α1FcLr
) .
Again, the derivation of Uo2r is analogous. Hence, the optimal utility is given by (51).
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Figure 1: N/No as a function of L.
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Figure 2: [p/(cw)]/[po/(cwo)] as a function of L.
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Figure 3: U/Uo as a function of L.
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Figure A1: f and g as a function of Yr.
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